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Response-Lawrence M. Friedman*
Some Thoughts on the Relationship Between Law and Political Science
The articles gathered in this symposium provide a rich, varied picture
of research at the meeting place of law and political science; and an
interesting platform from which to comment on how these two academic
disciplines relate to each other. The two fields have had a long but not
always intimate connection. The connection, as is well known, was
broken off in the late 19th century. Political science was in its infancy;
and the study of law, as Langdell and others conceived it, found it most
profitable to turn more and more in on itself. For most of the time since
then, political science departments and law schools have tended their
own gardens, barely speaking to each other. It is only in the last
generation that the two have come at all closer together.
I take it that political science, though an extremely catholic field,
pinches off, as its subject matter, the study of power and authority. It is
mainly though not exclusively concerned with public power and public
authority-with government, in a word. That the core of political science
is the science of government is not really a matter of dispute. Political
scientists are much more likely to fight among themselves over method.
To an outsider, the debate between behaviorists and non-behaviorists is
as mysterious as it is raucous and unseemly (at times). To an outsider, it
is not clear why the field cannot encompass all sorts of methods and
philosophies. Perhaps at the root of the trouble is a dispute about power
and prestige, about the politics of political science. At any rate, whoever
ultimately seizes control of departments of political science, it seems
clear that empirical, quantitative research on problems of government,
including law, is here to stay.
There have been intramural battles within legal education, too, some
of them not dissimilar to the battles within political science. C.C.
Langdell founded at Harvard (1870) what has become a kind of
standard, classic model of legal education, partly dogmatic, partly
practical. The training method had its counterpart in partly dogmatic,
partly practical research, which produced the ponderous treatises
(Williston was the heaviest) that formed the most famous output of
university teachers of law. Out-and-out clinical training has recently
made a strong bid to regain a foothold in legal education, and there has
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also been a growing interest in social science research in law
schools-more interest than research, unfortunately. All three
tendencies-the classical, the clinical, and the social science-might
conceivably coexist rather neatly in the law schools; in fact, they coexist
badly if at all. Apparently, some law professors conceive of control of
legal education as a single, indivisible good, like kingship or deanship.
This adds a certain bitter tang to discussions of the methods and goals of
legal science.
That political science which sends out feelers to the law schools is, as a
matter of fact, strongly behavioral. Those who, in the law school world,
come to meet it half way, are also mainly scholars who are committed to
social science research in the law. These two groups at any rate seem to
get on well; they have a common purpose. Most of the concerns of
political scientists are quite relevant to the study of law;-perhaps the
statistical analysis of voting behavior is an exception. Legal academics,
to be sure, are not terribly interested in many other kinds of current
research-on political socialization, for example; but perhaps they
should be. But, while a great deal of what political science does is
irrelevant to the practice of law, if (suppose) law schools were magically
transformed into double institutes, devoted half to scientific study of
law, half to clinical training in the practice, there is no inherent reason
why the nonclinical side could not comfortably slip into a political
science department, or vice versa. It would hardly matter which one
swallowed the other up. In this symposium, there is a study of law
enforcement, a study of judicial socialization-subjects of high concern
to both fields, and an essay which relates to legal studies the body of
materials on political culture. A behavioral law professor would be as
likely to find these essays interesting as a behavioral political scientist.
The two disciplines are, of course, different in other ways. Training is
likely to be different. A few political scientists have law degrees; a few
active law professors carry the Ph.D. in political science, the badge of
that field's authority. Most, however, have the field though not the
training in common. Lawyers and political scientists, even when they
think they are using similar methods and attacking similar problems,
may have quite different outlooks. But these differences flow from
differences in socializations, and in career paths, I suspect, rather than
from more deep-seated, timeless factors. Political sociologists are
another breed who deal with power, authority and government; and
indeed, share methodology too with behavioral political science.
Compared to a "political sociologist", a "political scientist" has
[Vol. 1971:359
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1971/iss2/11
Vol. 1971:3591
probably undergone somewhat different training, been exposed to
different teachers, read different books "outside his field," learned to
look up and down at different reference groups, gone to different
conventions and conferences; learned, in short, to behave and think
differently in some regards, simply because of the structural path his
career has taken. These differences may be diminishing. So too for
lawyers. The articles in this symposium do not seem out of place in a law
review; indeed, they. -.em perfectly at home.
Political science is obviously useful to law, in the sense of promoting
understanding of legal process. At least the promise is immense, even if
one feels (as some do) that the work so far in the field has not quite lived
up to this promise. One source of disappointment may simply be that
some problems turn out to be unyielding; current techniques are simply
not adequate for solution. This may be the case with the problem of
ferreting out secrets of Supreme Court decision-making. On the other
hand, work like Richard Fayey's study of the enforcement of the Illinois
marijuana laws deals with behavior which is, unit for unit, not as
suffused with grandeur as the case-law of the Supreme Court; and yet, in
the aggregate, is of considerable social importance. To show that "what
people label deviant is . . . subject to change," and to put a search-light
on the process of law enforcement, is certainly not an unimportant
enterprise.'
Fahey's article illustrates one "use" of political science in law, one
with obvious implications for public policy, though to be sure the
authorities are often deaf. Sometimes political science data can be used
even more directly. Occasionally, social science can be injected directly
into the bloodstream of law, in the form of expert evidence at trial, or as
supporting material (theory or data) to buttress a brief on appeal. In this
way, social science may help engineer social change in the ordinary
course of legal process. There have been, in recent years, a number of
examples of this use of social science; enough to kindle a certain degree
of enthusiasm, both among lawyers and social scientists. One of the
essays in this symposium is a case in point, showing how social science
evidence can be marshalled in support of legal change-Professor
Burnham's account of his role in the Texas litigation.2 The tradition of
using hard but non-legal evidence goes back at least as far as the
Brandeis brief in Muller v. Oregon3 and very likely further. Use of
1. Fahey, The Enforcement of the Illinois Felony Mariuana Law in Chicago, at -. infra.
2. Burnham, A Political ,Scientist and Voting-Rights Litigation: The Case of the 1966 Texas
Registration Statute, at 335 supra.
3. 208 U.S.412 (1908).
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scientific data (besides or instead of raw case material and statutes) is
surely on the upswing; and while political science or sociology or
economics does not pull the weight of blood tests or ballistics, it has not
been left out in the cold.
That the Brandeis brief could be filed at all, that Professor Burnham
could do his research and play his role in the Texas voter case, are signs
that the legal profession has begun to emerge from its coffin of concepts
and has begun to let in the air of the outside world. The classic theories
treated law as a "science", independent of other sciences. Law
supposedly moved on the wheels of its own indigenous principles. These
and these alone gave legitimacy to judicial decisions at least. Legitimacy,
which is a set of cultural values, is in constant evolution; and old theories
treating law as a law unto itself, rather than as a social instrument, are
slipping into oblivion. The more contemporary concept of law is frankly
utilitarian. It tends to welcome change, and therefore looks with favor
on ideas and facts from the social context-anything that will serve and
reach the purpose. 4
Most of us, if only because we are helpless creatures of our times, will
applaud changes in legitimacy that have taken place in the law. There is
no room in our world-view for traditional legal culture. On the other
hand, one must be cautious in measuring the change in outcomes that
has actually taken place. How much of the "reception" of social science
is style rather then substance? Take, for example, the famous social
science footnote, in the school desegregation case.5 It created quite a stir;
some thought the Court was behaving outrageously; some, mainly social
scientists, could scarcely contain their joy at the thought that they had,
at long last, entered the sacred precincts.6 But do we really know what
role social science played in the actual decision of the case? Sophisticated
lawyers and social scientists had long argued, quite persuasively, that the
string of citations that courts regularly shoveled into their opinions did
not really explain how the judges behaved, how their minds moved, what
forces they responded to. The essay by Grossman and Sarat is in this
tradition. 7 It would be a pity if naive legal determinism were transferred
4. Friedman, On Legal Development, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. I (1969).
5. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954): the court felt that segregation was harmful
to minority children, a "finding. . . amply supported by modern authority," whatever "may have
been the extent of psychological knowledge" at the time. The Court then cited a number of modern
studies of prejudice and segregation by social scientists.
6. See, e.g., Cahn, A Dangerous Myth in the School Segregation Case, 30 N.Y.U. L. REv. 150
(1955); Clark, The Segregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientist's Role, 5 VILL. L. REV. 224
(1959).
7. Grossman & Sarat, Political Culture and Judicial Research, at 177 supra.
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from citations of precedents to citations of books by social scientists. We
do not know when these citations are rationalizations after the fact of
decision, and when they are not. Professor Burnham's article is, I think,
an example of a use of data that may be much more than window-
dressing. Information can be a powerful force to open the cognitive
windows of law. But the basic message of social-scientific studies of law
is that legal behavior is tough, complex, and much intertwined with
powerful, long-standing social forces. These findings have not been
overruled merely because courts more freely cite and quote a new kind of
source. It behooves social scientists to be rather humble about the role
that they can play. It is still power that talks and molds the law;
knowledge is part of this power, but very far from all.
The essays in the symposium, for all their variety, seem to stand
firmly in the middle of the road in political science. They do not directly
reflect the new voices from within the disciplines that accuse social
science itself of unreality, even repression. Young Turks, in every field,
assert that old guard social science inhibits social change, stifles what is
fruitful in progressive thought, eagerly acts as lackey to conservative
forces. In part, their work is a portion of the healthy process of laying
bare the hidden assumptions of the past generation of scholars. But some
radicals go beyond this role; they reject the concept of value-free
research; they want to feel and to act; they do not want to study and
explain every impulse to death. There are similar strong tendencies
among young lawyers. Fiery advocates-many in the pay of OEO-have
plunged into community organization, poverty-action work and
aggressive litigation against big business and big government. Yet even
this is one full turn of the wheel less argent than the work of active
revolutionaries. Militant as it is, it maintains one foot within the system,
and is one step removed from direct, hand-to-hand action. The social
scientist who comes to the law is one step even further removed from
white heat. If he is careful and empirical, full of wisdom about strategy,
interest groups, and balance, he serves to dampen ardor. The litigators
are anxious to use social science, when it serves their purposes; they do
not necessarily want to listen to its message. Social science research has
fallen under a shadow, in some radical quarters, not because it is
unthinking and inexact, but precisely because the more it is careful and
comprehensive, the more paralytic it becomes. Scratch deeply at a social
problem, and all the blacks and whites merge into gray. To understand
everything may not be to condone everything, but it comes dangerously
close.
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I make this point because it seems to me that trouble may lie ahead for
those of us who feel that social science has an enormous role to play in
legal education, a role of salvation and resurrection. The smug self-
satisfaction of legal education retarded, for years, the interdisciplinary
study of law. That self-satisfaction is now in process of retreat, and there
is underway a serious movement to reform, recast, and revitalize legal
education. There are two attacking armies: one from the clinical-activist
side, and another from the social science side. The two forces are now
allied, in rather uneasy coalition, against their joint enemy, the
traditional forms of legal education. By rights, the two forces should
remain good friends. But will they? It would not be the first time that
allies fell out after a victory. In a law school dominated by clinical
activists, what will become of social science? Will it be given a place of
honor, or will it be thrown out (or exiled into other parts of the
university), except insofar as it is willing to serve as a humble servant of
the Pharaoh, making bricks for his temple? This possibility is real; it has
some basis in the history and structure of legal education. The final
outcome, only time can tell. Dr. Barker's introduction to the symposium
takes a position, as I read it, of quiet optimism. He reads the testimony
of events to say that a long, productive union of law and political science
seems certain to sustain itself and grow. For the sake of both
disciplines-and for the sake of the administration of justice, which
would, in the long run, immeasurably gain-one hopes that events will
bear him out.
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